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ABSTRACT
Wireless communication enables a broad spectrum of appli-
cations, ranging from commodity to tactical systems. Neigh-
bor discovery (ND), that is, determining which devices are
within direct radio communication, is a building block of
network protocols and applications, and its vulnerability can
severely compromise their functionalities. A number of pro-
posals to secure ND have been published, but none have
analyzed the problem formally. In this paper, we contribute
such an analysis: We build a formal model capturing salient
characteristics of wireless systems, most notably obstacles
and interference, and we provide a specification of a basic
variant of the ND problem. Then, we derive an impossibility
result for a general class of protocols we term “time-based
protocols,” to which many of the schemes in the literature
belong. We also identify the conditions under which the im-
possibility result is lifted. Moreover, we explore a second
class of protocols we term “time- and location-based proto-
cols,” and prove they can secure ND.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection
General Terms
Security
Keywords
wireless networks security, secure neighbor discovery, relay
attack
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networking is a key enabler for mobile communica-
tion systems, that range from cellular infrastructure-based
data networks and wireless local area networks (WLANs)
to disaster-relief, tactical, and sensor networks, and short-
range wire replacement and radio frequency identification
(RFID) technologies. In all such systems, any two wireless
devices communicate directly when in range, without the as-
sistance of other devices. The ability to determine if direct,
one-hop, communication takes place is fundamental. For ex-
ample, a WLAN access point (AP) assigns a new IP address
to a mobile station only when it is within the AP’s coverage
area. Or, a mobile node does not initiate a route discovery
across a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) if a sought des-
tination is already in its neighbor table. Or, an RFID tag
will be read only if the signal transmitted by the tag can be
received directly by the reader. These examples illustrate
that, depending on whether another system entity, denoted
as node in the rest of the paper, is a neighbor or not, actions
are taken (e.g., by the AP or the router) or implications are
derived (e.g., the RFID tag and reader are physically close).
In other words, discovering a neighbor, or knowing that a
node is a neighbor, is a common building block and enabler
of diverse system functionality.
Nonetheless, if an attack against neighbor discovery (ND)
can be perpetrated, such functionality can be abused. For
example, letting legitimate nodes erroneously believe that
they are neighbors allows the adversary to fully control com-
munication across these artificial links. The threat lies in
that the attacker can deny or derange communication at
any point; this can happen exactly at the moment a mes-
sage critical for the system operation is transmitted. In
multi-hop networks, a “well-chosen” artificial link is likely
to attract a considerable number of routes, with devastating
effects: denial of communication across all these routes and
significant disturbance in the flow of data. In a different sce-
nario, misleading an RFID tag reader that the tag (and its
owner) is physically close to the RFID reader, while this is
not so, can enable the adversary to gain unauthorized access
to the premises of the tag owner.
Such attacks against ND are easy to mount, because the
common solution is to have nodes broadcast their identity,
so that reception at node A of such a beacon from node B
suffices for A to add B to its neighbor table. This can be
abused by an adversary that forges beacons and misleads
a correct, protocol-abiding, node into believing that it has
fictitious neighbors. Entity authentication may appear as
a solution. Authentication does not imply, however, the
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node is a neighbor. It only establishes which node created a
message but not which sent it across the wireless medium.
To illustrate this, consider A and B unable to communicate
directly, and C within range of both A and B. Node C re-
ceives and repeats B’s beacon, for example, digitally signed
and time-stamped, with no modification. Then, A receives
the beacon and discovers B as a neighbor, even though this
is not so. Precisely because A cannot distinguish whether
the message (beacon) was sent directly by B or it was relayed
by another node.
A number of schemes were designed to thwart such relay
attacks, often termed wormholes, and essentially safeguard
ND. Distance bounding [2] is the basic approach: the dis-
tance of two nodes is estimated by measuring the signal
time of flight from and to those nodes. If the estimate is be-
low a threshold corresponding to the nodes’ communication
range, the node is accepted as a neighbor. This may provide
the desired level of security for some applications; e.g., if an
RFID reader can conclude that a tag is within a range of
10cm, it is safe to have the building door opened. In other
words, what this approach provides is discovery of physical
neighborhood. However, for two nodes to be communication
neighbors (which we term simply as “neighbors” in the rest
of the paper), proximity is not sufficient [19]. Obstacles or
interference can prevent nearby nodes from communicating
directly. This allows the attacker to abuse a ND mechanism
oblivious to such obstructions and to mislead two near-by
nodes into believing they are neighbors while they are not.
This aspect of ND has been largely overlooked by schemes
proposed to date.
In this paper, we address this problem, by answering a more
fundamental question: To what extent is secure neighbor
discovery possible? We focus on the most generally applica-
ble variant of ND, which only requires two nodes to establish
a neighbor relation; relying on additional nodes to assist the
ND process can be impractical, especially in low-density net-
works. We prove that for a large class of protocols, which
includes many of the proposals in the literature, it is impos-
sible to achieve secure ND. On the positive side, we propose
a protocol from a different class and prove that it can in fact
provide secure neighbor discovery.
To reach this result, we contribute the first formal investi-
gation of secure ND. We provide a model of wireless ad hoc
networks rich enough to capture the problem at hand, and
a specification of what we term the two-party ND. Then,
we analyze the above-mentioned two general classes of pro-
tocols. We denote the first one time-based protocols (T-
protocols), for which nodes exchange messages and are able
to measure time with perfect accuracy. For this class, we
show the following impossibility result : No T-protocol can
solve the (secure) ND problem if adversarial nodes are able
to relay messages with a delay below a certain threshold
(Section 3). On the contrary, if the minimum relaying de-
lay is above that same threshold, we show it is possible
to achieve secure ND (Section 4). Then, in Section 5, we
consider the second class of protocols we term time- and
location-based protocols (TL-protocols): nodes are, in addi-
tion to T-protocol capabilities, aware of their location. We
show that TL-protocols can secure ND even if adversarial
nodes can relay messages with almost no delay.
Existing solutions, discussed in Section 7, were not formally
analyzed. A fraction of those schemes are indeed affected
by our impossibility result. For the rest, our discussion in
Section 7 points out other weakness and reflects concepts
introduced here. Furthermore, in Section 6, we discuss in
detail the implications of our results, model assumptions, as
well as practical considerations on protocol design, before
we conclude with future work.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
We are interested in modeling a wireless network: its ba-
sic entities, nodes, are processes running on computational
platforms equipped with transceivers communicating over a
wireless channel. We assume that nodes have synchronized
clocks and are static (not mobile). Nodes either follow the
implemented system functionality, in which case we denote
them as correct, or they are under the control of an adver-
sary, in which case we denote them as adversarial nodes.
We model communication at the physical layer, rather than
at higher layers (data link, network, or application), in order
to capture the inherent characteristics of neighbor discovery
in wireless networks. For simplicity, correct nodes are as-
sumed to use a single wireless channel and omnidirectional
antennas, but we do not require them to have equal trans-
mission power and receiver sensitivity. On the other hand,
adversarial nodes have enhanced capabilities: use directional
antennas and are able to communicate not only across the
wireless channel used by correct nodes, but also across a ded-
icated adversary channel imperceptible to correct nodes.
Our system model comprises: (i) a setting S, which de-
scribes the type (correct or adversarial) of nodes, their loca-
tion and how the wireless channel state changes over time;
(ii) a protocol model P, which determines the behavior of
correct nodes; (iii) an adversary model A, which determines
the capabilities of adversarial nodes.
We make the assumption that if we look at the system at any
point in time, one or more phenomena occur. We are inter-
ested in phenomena relevant to the wireless communication
and the system at hand and, consequently, to our analy-
sis. We denote these phenomena, associated with nodes, as
events (Definition 2). Then, we model the system evolution
over time using the notion of trace, i.e., a set of events (Defi-
nition 3). More precisely, we use feasible traces, that satisfy
constraints specified by S (proper correspondence between
wireless sending and receiving of messages), P (correct nodes
follows the protocol), and A (adversarial nodes behave ac-
cording to their capabilities).
The specification of secure neighbor discovery is provided
exclusively with respect to feasible traces. It consists of two
properties requiring that (i) if a node concludes that some
other correct node is a neighbor, then it is indeed a neigh-
bor (in every feasible trace), and (ii) if two correct nodes
are neighbors, it should be possible for them to conclude
they are neighbors (in some setting and feasible trace). We
call this two-party neighbor discovery, with only two nodes
participating in an ND protocol run. We discuss later an
alternative multi-party ND, which relies on the participa-
tion of additional correct nodes to conclude successfully on
whether two nodes are neighbors or not.
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2.1 System Parameters
We list the parameters of our system model. They are used
by the protocols, and are known to the protocol designer
and to the adversary, both of whom have limited control
over their values.
• V, the set of unique node identifiers, which for simplic-
ity we will consider equivalent with the nodes them-
selves,
• v ∈ R>0, the signal propagation speed across the wire-
less channel,
• vadv > v, the information propagation speed over the
adversary channel,
• M, the set of messages,
• |.| : M→ R>0, the message duration function.
Parameter v defines how fast messages propagate across the
wireless channel, and once a communication technology is
selected, this cannot be controlled by the system designer.
Parameter vadv is under the control of the adversary: he
can choose the technology and thus how fast information
can propagate between adversarial nodes across the adver-
sary channel. The message space is system-specific and un-
der the control of the system designer, whereas the message
duration function, which determines the transmission delay
(not including the propagation delay),also depends on the
technology used and the achievable transmission rates, e.g.,
in bits per second.
2.2 Settings
A setting describes the type and location of nodes, and how
the state of the wireless channel changes over time.
Definition 1. A setting S is a tuple 〈V, loc, type, link〉,
where:
• V ⊂ V is a finite set of nodes. An ordered pair (A,B) ∈
V 2 is called a link.
• loc : V → R2 is called a location function1. As we
assume nodes are not mobile, this function does not
depend on time. We define dist : V × V → R>0 as
dist(A,B) = d2(loc(A), loc(B)), where d2 is the Eu-
clidean distance in R2. We require the loc function
to be injective, so that no two nodes share the same
location. Thus, dist(A,B) > 0 for A 6= B.
• type : V → {correct , adversarial} is the type func-
tion; it defines which nodes are correct and which are
adversarial. This function does not depend on time,
as we assume that the adversary does not corrupt new
nodes during the system execution. We denote Vcor =
type−1({correct}) and Vadv = type−1({adversarial}).
1All the results of this paper can be immediately transcribed
to R3. The R2 space is used only for presentation simplicity.
• link : V 2 × R>0 → {up, down} is the link state func-
tion. Accordingly to this function we say that at a
given time t > 0, a link (A,B) ∈ V 2 is up (denoted
t ::A→B) or down (denoted t ::A9B). We use ab-
breviations t ::A↔B =def t ::A→B ∧ t ::B→A and
t ::A=B =def t ::A9B ∧ t ::B9A. We extend the
“t ::A→B” notation from single time points to sets as
follows: T ::A→B =def ∀t ∈ T, t ::A→B. We assume
the convention R>0 ::A9A.
We denote the set of all settings by Σ.
2.3 Traces
We use the notion of trace to model an execution of the
system. A trace is composed of events. We model events re-
lated to the wireless communication and the detection of a
neighbor. The former, denoted as Bcast, Dcast and Receive,
models broadcast (or omnidirectional) transmission, direc-
tional transmission, and reception, respectively. The latter,
denoted as Neighbor, means that a node accepts another
node as a neighbor. Each event is primarily associated with
(essentially, takes place at) a node we denote as the active
node. For some events, a secondary association with another
node can exist. In particular:
Definition 2. An event is one of the following terms:
• Bcast(A; t;m)
• Dcast(A; t;α, β,m)
• Receive(A; t;B,m)
• Neighbor(A; t;C, t′)
where: A ∈ V is the active node, t ∈ R>0 is the start time,
m ∈ M is a message, α ∈ [0, 2pi) is the sending direction,
β ∈ (0, 2pi] is the sending angle, B ∈ V is the sender node,
C ∈ V is a declared neighbor, t′ ∈ R>0 is the time at which
C is a neighbor according to A’s declaration.
For an event e, we write start(e) for its start time and
end(e) for its end time. For events including a message
m, end(e) = start(e) + |m|, while for the Neighbor event
end(e) = start(e).
Dcast, representing a message sent with a directional an-
tenna at direction α over an angle β, is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. Receive represents message reception triggered (caused)
by any incoming message, and thus a previous Bcast and
Dcast event (self-triggered at the sending node). Neighbor
can be thought of as an internal outcome of a neighbor dis-
covery protocol (to be defined later). Then, traces compris-
ing the above events are defined.
Definition 3. A trace θ is a set of events that satisfies
what we will call the finite cut condition: for any finite t > 0,
the subset {e ∈ θ | start(e) < t} is finite.
We denote the set of all traces by Θ.
3
αβ2
β
2
A
Figure 1: Range of the Dcast primitive.
inrange(A,α, β,B) is true iff B is located in the
gray region.
The finite cut condition ensures that during a finite amount
of time only a finite number of events occurs; as settings
comprise a finite number of nodes, this is natural to demand.
2.4 Setting-Feasible Traces
Feasibility with respect to a setting S is a set of conditions
ensuring a proper causal and time relation between send and
receive events.
Definition 4. A trace θ ∈ Θ is feasible with respect to
a setting S = 〈V, loc, type, link〉, if the following conditions
are satisfied:
1. ∀Receive(A; t;B,m) ∈ θ,
(A,B ∈ V ) ∧ ([t, t+ |m|] ::B→A) ∧
(Bcast(B; t− tAB ;m) ∈ θ Y (inrange(B,α, β,A) ∧
Dcast(B; t− tAB ;α, β,m) ∈ θ))
2. ∀Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ, (A ∈ V ) ∧
(∀B ∈ V, [t+ tAB , t+ tAB + |m|] ::A→B =⇒
Receive(B; t+ tAB ;A,m) ∈ θ)
3. ∀Dcast(A; t;α, β,m) ∈ θ, (A ∈ Vadv) ∧
(∀B ∈ V, (inrange(A,α, β,B) ∧
[t+ tAB , t+ tAB + |m|] ::A→B) =⇒
Receive(B; t+ tAB ;A,m) ∈ θ)
Where Y denotes logical exclusive or, tAB = dist(A,B)v is the
time of flight, and inrange(A,α, β,B) is defined in Figure 1.
We denote the set of all traces feasible with respect to a
setting S by ΘS .
Condition 1 of Definition 4 ensures that every message that
is received was previously sent. Condition 2 ensures that a
broadcasted message is received by all nodes enabled to do
so by the link relation.2 Condition 3 ensures that a Dcast-
ed message is received only by the nodes in the area as per
the Dcast transmission (see Figure 1) and only if the link
is up. In other words, communication is causal (a receive
is always preceded by a sent), and reliable as long as the
2Note that time is “measured” at the receiver, not the
sender.
link is up. Unreliability, expected and common in wireless
communications, is modeled by the state of the link being
down. Furthermore, the three conditions in Definition 4
introduce a strict time relation between events, reflecting
line-of-sight signal propagation across the channel with a
constant speed v.
2.5 Protocol-Feasible Traces
A trace is essentially a global view of the system execution.
To describe what a node observes during a system execution,
we use the notion of local view, primarily comprising a local
trace composed of local events. We define these next.
Definition 5. A local event is one of the terms:
Bcast(t;m), Receive(t;m), Neighbor(t;B, t′), where B ∈ V,
m ∈ M, t, t′ ∈ R>0. For a local event e, start(e), end(e) are
defined as in Definition 2.
Definition 6. A local trace is a set of local events that
satisfies the finite cut condition. Given a node identifier
A ∈ V, time t > 0 and trace θ ∈ Θ, we calculate the local
trace of node A at time t in trace θ, denoted θ|A,t, as follows:
θ|A,t ={Bcast(t1;m) | t1 < t ∧
Bcast(A; t1;m) ∈ θ} ∪ (1)
{Receive(t1;m) | t1 + |m| < t ∧
∃B ∈ V, Receive(A; t1;B,m) ∈ θ} ∪ (2)
{Neighbor(t1;B, t′) | t1 < t ∧
Neighbor(A; t1;B, t
′) ∈ θ} (3)
We call θ|A,∞ a complete local trace of A in θ and denote
it shortly θ|A.
Note that the Receive local event, contrary to its global coun-
terpart, does not include the information about the sender
of the message. This is of central importance, capturing the
earlier mentioned fundamental challenge in securing ND in
wireless networks: the receiver of a message cannot reliably
identify who the sender is. This is because identifiers in-
cluded in a message can be forged, and even cryptography
can at most allow to identify the creator of a message, not
the sender.
We identify two variants of the local view notion: an T-
local view, as the basis for defining the class of time-based
protocols, and an TL-local view, used to define the class of
time- and location-based protocols.
Definition 7. Given a trace θ, an T-local view of node
A at time t in θ is a tuple 〈A, t, θ|A,t〉; we denote it θ||A,t.
Definition 8. Given a trace θ and a setting S, an TL-
local view of node A at time t in θ is a tuple 〈A, t, loc(A), θ|A,t〉;
we denote it θ||S,A,t, or θ||A,t is setting S is clear from the
context.
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Note that S is part of Definition 8 as the location of node
A is defined only within a specific setting. With the notion
of local view(s) in hand, we can proceed with the definition
of a protocol model. This definition captures the property
of protocols essential to our investigation: the fact that pro-
tocol behavior depends exclusively on the local view of the
node executing the protocol.
Definition 9. An T(TL)-protocol model P is a function
which given a T(TL)-local view θ||A,t, determines a finite,
non-empty set of actions; an action is one of the terms: ²,
Bcast(m) or Neighbor(A, t), where m ∈ M, A ∈ V, t ∈ R>0.
The interpretation of Bcast and Neighbor actions is natu-
ral. The ² action means that the node does not execute
an event, with the exception of possible Receive event(s).
Note that modeling the protocol output (i.e., the protocol
model codomain) as a family of sets of actions allows for
non-deterministic protocols.
Definition 10. A trace θ ∈ ΘS is feasible with respect
to a T- or TL-protocol model P, if the following conditions
are satisfied:
1. ∀A ∈ Vcor, ∀Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ, Bcast(m) ∈ P(θ||A,t)
2. ∀A ∈ Vcor, ∀Neighbor(A; t;B, t′) ∈ θ,
Neighbor(B, t′) ∈ P(θ||A,t)
3. ∀A ∈ Vcor, ∀t ∈ XA, ² ∈ P(θ||A,t), where
XA = R>0 \ start(θ|A ∩ E),
E = {Bcast(t;m) | m ∈ M, t ∈ R>0} ∪
{Neighbor(t;B, t′) | B ∈ V, t, t′ ∈ R>0}
We denote the set of all traces feasible with respect to a
setting S and T(TL)-protocol model P by ΘS,P .
Conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 10 ensure that Bcast of
Neighbor actions taken by a node are allowed by the pro-
tocol. Condition 3, with XA the set of all points in time
at which no event other than Receive happens at node A,
ensures that the protocol allows for a node to not perform
an action.
2.6 Adversary-Feasible Traces
For the purpose of the impossibility result, we consider first
a relatively limited adversary, that is only capable of re-
laying messages. We denote this model as A∆relay , with
the ∆relay > 0 parameter the minimum relaying delay intro-
duced by an adversarial node; this delay is due to processing
exclusively, it does not include any propagation time.
Definition 11. A trace θ ∈ ΘS,P is feasible with respect
to an adversary model A∆relay if:
1. ∀Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ, A /∈ Vadv
2. ∀Dcast(A; t;α, β,m) ∈ θ, ∃B ∈ Vadv,
∃δ > ∆relay + dist(A,B)vadv , ∃C ∈ V,
Receive(B; t− δ;C,m) ∈ θ
We denote the set of all traces feasible with respect to a
setting S, T-protocol model P, and adversary model A∆relay
by ΘS,P,A∆relay .
Condition 1 of Definition 11 is only to facilitate the pre-
sentation of proofs in subsequent sections, stating that ad-
versarial nodes do not use the Bcast primitive. Condition 2
states that every message sent by an adversarial node is nec-
essarily a replay of a message m that either this or another
adversarial node received. In addition, the delay between re-
ceiving m and re-sending it, or more precisely the difference
between the start times of the corresponding events, needs
to be at least ∆relay, plus the propagation delay across the
adversary channel in case another adversarial node received
the relayed message.
FromA∆relay , we derive two weaker adversary models, A′∆relay
and A′′∆relay , defined next. Model A′∆relay restricts adversar-
ial nodes to broadcasts, while A′′∆relay precludes adversarial
nodes from utilizing an adversary channel. As it will become
clear in Section 3, all these adversary models are valuable
for the impossibility result, and their weakness strengthens
the impossibility result.
Definition 12. A trace θ ∈ ΘS,P is feasible with respect
to an adversary model A′∆relay if:
1. ∀Dcast(A; t;α, β,m) ∈ θ, A /∈ Vadv
2. ∀Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ ∈ θ, ∃B ∈ Vadv,
∃δ > ∆relay + dist(A,B)vadv , ∃C ∈ V,
Receive(B; t− δ;C,m) ∈ θ
Definition 13. A trace θ ∈ ΘS,P is feasible with respect
to an adversary model A′′∆relay if:
1. ∀Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ, A /∈ Vadv
2. ∀Dcast(A; t;α, β,m) ∈ θ, ∃δ > ∆relay,
∃C ∈ V, Receive(A; t− δ;C,m) ∈ θ
2.7 Neighbor Discovery Specification
The ability to communicate directly, without the interven-
tion or ’assistance’ of relays, is expressed in our model by a
link being up, thus the following definition:
Definition 14. Node A is a neighbor of node B in set-
ting S at time t, if t ::A→B. If t ::A↔B we will say that
nodes A and B are neighbors at time t.
For simplicity of presentation, we use the “t ::A→B” no-
tation to denote the neighbor relation, as well as the link
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relation. Having defined the neighbor relation, we are ready
to present the formal specification of secure neighbor dis-
covery. This definition uses a parameter: R ∈ R>0, the
neighbor discovery (ND) range. Typically, R is equal to the
nominal communication range for a given wireless medium,
however, we use R more freely as the communication range
for which ND inferences are drawn.
Definition 15. A protocol model P satisfies(solves) two-
party neighbor discovery for an adversary model A, if the
following properties are both satisfied:
ND1 ∀S ∈ Σ, ∀θ ∈ ΘS,P,A, ∀A,B ∈ Vcor,
Neighbor(A; t;B, t′) ∈ θ =⇒ t′ ::B→A
ND2 ∀d ∈ (0,R], ∀A,B ∈ V, A 6= B, ∃S ∈ Σ,
V = Vcor = {A,B} ∧ dist(A,B) = d ∧ R>0 ::A↔B
∧ ∃θ ∈ ΘS,P,A, Neighbor(A; t;B, t′) ∈ θ
Intuitively, property ND1 requires that if a node accepts some
other correct node B as a neighbor at time t′, then B is ac-
tually a neighbor at that time. Property ND2 complements
ND1, assuring that the protocol offers minimal availability :
it requires that for every distance d in the desired ND range
R, there should be at least some setting, in which the pro-
tocol is able to conclude that a node is a neighbor (in some,
not all executions); this setting should contain exactly two
nodes at distance d, being neighbors, and both correct. The
“two-nodes setting” requirement clarifies why we call this
two-party ND. The ND2 property is the least that can be
required from a usable two-party ND protocol: indeed, a
protocol not satisfying this property would be unable to con-
clude, for some distance(s) in the ND range, that nodes are
neighbors. This makes the impossibility result in Section 3
more meaningful: impossibility with respect to a weak prop-
erty implies impossibility for any stronger property.
3. IMPOSSIBILITY FOR T-PROTOCOLS
We show in this section that no time-based protocol can
solve the two-party neighbor discovery problem as specified
by Definition 15. We base the proof on the fact, captured in
Lemma 1, that it is impossible for a correct node to distin-
guish between different settings based on an T-local view.
The impossibility result in Theorem 1 stems from showing
two settings which are indistinguishable by a correct node,
one in which two nodes are neighbors and one where they
are not. We elaborate on the assumptions and implications
of this result in Section 6.
We emphasize that the non-restricted form of the message
space M encompasses all possible messages including, for
example, time-stamps and any type of cryptography, thus
contributing to the generality of the impossibility result.
Lemma 1. Let P be a T-protocol model, S and S ′ be set-
tings such that Vcor = V
′
cor, and θ ∈ ΘS,P and θ′ ∈ ΘS′
be traces such that local traces θ|A = θ′|A for all A ∈ Vcor.
Then θ′ is feasible with respect to T-protocol model P.
A B
(a) Sa
A B
C
(b) Sb
C
A B
D
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(c) Sc
Figure 2: Settings used in the impossibility result
proof. Settings Sa = 〈{A,B}, loca, typea, linka〉,
Sb = 〈{A,B,C}, locb, typeb, linkb〉 and Sc =
〈{A,B,C,D}, locc, typec, linkc〉. In all settings, nodes
A and B are correct, nodes C and D are ad-
versarial. The location functions are such that
distb(A,C) + distb(B,C) + v∆relay 6 dista(A,B) 6 R and
distc(A,C) + distc(D,B) + v
vadv
distc(C,D) + v∆relay 6
dista(A,B). The state of links does not change over
time and is shown in the figure. The dashed arrow
in figure (c) denotes the adversarial channel.
Theorem 1. If ∆relay <
R
v
then there exists no T-protocol
model which satisfies neighbor discovery for the adversary
model A′′∆relay .
Proof. To prove that under the assumptions of the the-
orem no T-protocol model can satisfy both ND1 and ND2, we
show that any T-protocol model that satisfies ND2 cannot
satisfy ND1.
Take any T-protocol model P satisfying ND2. Pick some
distance > v∆relay in the ND range. Property ND2 guar-
antees the existence of a setting such as the one shown in
Figure 2(a) (we denote it Sa) and the existance of a trace
θ ∈ ΘSa,P,A∆relay such that Neighbor(A; t;B, t
′) ∈ θ. As θ
is feasible with respect to setting Sa, this trace has to be of
the form:
θ =
˘
Bcast(A; ti;mi) | i ∈ IA
¯ ∪˘
Receive(B; ti +∆;A,mi) | i ∈ IA
¯ ∪˘
Bcast(B; ti;mi) | i ∈ IB
¯ ∪˘
Receive(A; ti +∆;B,mi) | i ∈ IB
¯ ∪˘
Neighbor(A; ti;B, t
′
i) | i ∈ JA
¯ ∪˘
Neighbor(B; ti;A, t
′
i) | i ∈ JB
¯
where ∆ = dist
a(A,B)
v
, ti, t
′
i ∈ R>0 and IA, IB , JA, JB are
pairwise disjoint index sets with JA 6= ∅ (all the other index
sets can be empty).
In setting Sb, shown in figure 2(b), we have R>0 ::B=A.
Consider the following trace θ′, which is is essentially the
same as θ, but for node C relaying all the communication
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between nodes A and B:
θ′ =
˘
Bcast(A; ti;mi) | i ∈ IA
¯ ∪˘
Receive(C; ti + δ1;A,mi) | i ∈ IA
¯ ∪˘
Dcast(C; ti + δ2; 0, pi,mi) | i ∈ IA
¯ ∪˘
Receive(B; ti +∆;C,mi) | i ∈ IA
¯ ∪˘
Bcast(B; ti;mi) | i ∈ IB
¯ ∪˘
Receive(C; ti + δ3;B,mi) | i ∈ IB
¯ ∪˘
Dcast(C; ti + δ4;−pi, pi,mi) | i ∈ IB
¯ ∪˘
Receive(A; ti +∆;C,mi) | i ∈ IB
¯ ∪˘
Neighbor(A; ti;B, t
′
i) | i ∈ JA
¯ ∪˘
Neighbor(B; ti;A, t
′
i) | i ∈ JB
¯
where δ1 =
distb(A,C)
v
, δ2 = ∆ − dist
b(C,B)
v
, δ3 =
distb(B,C)
v
and δ4 = ∆− dist
b(C,A)
v
.
It is simple to check that this trace is feasible with respect
to setting Sb. It is also feasible with respect to T-protocol
model P: as θ|A,t = θ′|A,t and θ|B,t = θ′|B,t, this follows
from Lemma 1. Finally, θ′ is feasible with respect to the
adversary model A∆relay , because δ2−δ1 = δ4−δ3 > ∆relay.
Therefore θ′ belongs to ΘSb,P,A∆relay and together with S
b
forms the counterexample that we were looking for: A con-
cludes B is a neighbor whereas it is not. Thus, T-protocol
model P does not satisfy ND1. As P was chosen arbitrarily,
this concludes the proof.
We can use the same technique (using settings Sa and Sc,
illustrated in Figure 2) to prove a corresponding theorem for
the adversary model A′∆relay :
Theorem 2. If ∆relay <
R
v
then there exists no T-protocol
model P which satisfies neighbor discovery for the adversary
model A′∆relay .
4. T-PROTOCOL SOLVING ND
Theorem 1 considers adversarial nodes that relay messages
with a delay smaller than R
v
. In this section we demonstrate
a specific T-protocol (we denote it as PT), which satisfies ND
(Definition 15) if the minimum relaying delay incurred by
adversarial nodes is greater than R
v
(Theorem 3, the proof
can be found in App. A).
Protocol. Informally, the PT protocol requires nodes to
transmit authenticated messages containing a time-stamp
set at the time of sending. Upon receipt of such a message, a
receiver checks its “freshness” by verifying that the message
time-stamp is within a threshold of the receiver’s current
time. If so, it accepts the message creator as a neighbor.
Note that this protocol is essentially the temporal packet
leash proposed by Hu, Perrig and Johnson in [13].
Message Space. We specify the message space relevant to
this particular T-protocol to be:
{authA(t)}A∈V,t∈R>0 ⊆ M
with authA(x) denoting that the content of message x is
authenticated by node A. We do not dwell on which cryp-
tographic primitive (e.g., digital signature or message au-
thentication code) is used to this end. We call the message
authA(t) a beacon message, and t the beacon-time.
Feasibility. Below we define feasibility with respect to pro-
tocol PT described informally above.3
Definition 16. A trace θ ∈ ΘS is feasible with respect
to PT, if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. ∀A ∈ Vcor, ∀Bcast(A; t1; authB(t)) ∈ θ,
(B = A) ∧ (t = t1)
2. ∀A ∈ Vcor, ∀Neighbor(A; t0;B, t1) ∈ θ, ∃C ∈ V,
(Receive(A; t1;C, authB(t)) ∈ θ) ∧ (t1 − t 6 Rv ) ∧
(t0 > end(Receive(A; t1;C, authB(t))))
Condition 1 ensures that a correct node only broadcasts bea-
con messages that are authenticated by itself and that have
the beacon-time set to the start of the beacon sending time.
Recall that correct nodes have synchronized clocks, other-
wise they cannot be considered correct. Condition 2 ensures
that a correct A accepts B as a neighbor only after it receives
and deems fresh a beacon generated by B.
Adversary Model. Towards proving that PT solves the ND
problem, we need to develop a stronger than A∆relay adver-
sary model. This is necessary, as proving that a protocol
is secure against a weak adversary would be of little value.
The new adversary model, AT∆relay , allows for not only mes-
sage relay but also for generation and transmission of any
message, as long as the employed cryptosystem is not bro-
ken (this approach is compliant with the classical Dolev-Yao
model [6]).
Definition 17. A trace θ ∈ ΘS,PT is feasible with respect
to an adversary model AT∆relay if:
1. ∀Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ, A /∈ Vadv
2. ∀A ∈ Vadv, ∀Dcast(A; t1;α, β, authB(t)) ∈ θ,
(B ∈ Vadv) ∨ (∃C ∈ Vadv, ∃δ > ∆relay + dist(C,A)vadv ,∃D ∈ V, Receive(C; t1 − δ;D, authB(t)) ∈ θ)
Condition 1 simplifies the presentation mandating that ad-
versarial nodes do not use the Bcast primitive. Nonetheless,
3For clarity and brevity, we define this “from scratch,”
rather than specifying an T-protocol model according to
Definition 9 and relying on Definition 10 for feasibility.
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this is not a limitation because Bcast(m) is equivalent to
Dcast(0, 2pi,m), by which we mean that it triggers exactly
the same Receive(m) events. Condition 2 ensures that an
adversarial node is allowed to send any message as long as
it is authenticated by an adversarial node (itself or other).
This implies that adversarial nodes can share cryptographic
keys or any material used for authentication. Furthermore,
Condition 2 reflects that the adversary cannot forge authen-
ticated messages: it ensures that a message sent by an ad-
versarial node, and authenticated by a correct node must
be a relayed one. In other words, some (possibly the same)
adversarial node must have received this message earlier,
at least ∆relay plus the propagation time between the two
nodes (over the adversarial channel).
Theorem 3. If ∆relay > Rv then PT satisfies neighbor
discovery for the adversary model AT∆relay .
5. TL-PROTOCOL SOLVING ND
Time- and location-based protocols, compared to the T-
protocol class, augment nodes with location awareness. Be-
cause nodes are more powerful, we can show that if v = vadv,
an TL-protocol we denote as PGT solves ND regardless of
how small ∆relay is. The reason the impossibility theorem
does not apply can be traced back to Lemma 1: even given
identical local traces, correct nodes can resort to location
information to distinguish setting Sa from Sb. The proof is
similar to that of the T-protocol case, found in App. A.
Protocol. Informally, the PGT protocol requires that nodes
send authenticated messages containing a time-stamp set at
the time of sending and their own location. Upon receipt
of such a message m sent from a node B, the receiver A
calculates two estimates of the A,B distance. The first esti-
mate is based on the difference of its own clock at reception
time (the start of reception) and m’s time-stamp. The sec-
ond one is calculated with the help of the location in m and
A’s location. If the two distance estimates are equal, and
m is authenticated, A accepts B as a neighbor. Note that
this protocol is a combination between the temporal and the
geographical packet leash [13].
Message Space. We specify the message space as follows:
{authA(t, l)}A∈V,t∈R>0,l∈R2 ⊆ M
We call the message authA(t, l) a beacon message, t the
beacon-time of the message, and l the beacon-location of the
message.
Feasibility. With the following we define feasibility with
respect to to PGT.
Definition 18. A trace θ ∈ ΘS is feasible with respect
to PGT, if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. ∀A ∈ Vcor, ∀Bcast(A; t1; authB(t, l)) ∈ θ,
B = A ∧ t = t1 ∧ l = loc(A)
2. ∀A ∈ Vcor, ∀Neighbor(A; t0;B, t1) ∈ θ, ∃C ∈ V,
Receive(A; t1;C, authB(t, l)) ∈ θ ∧ t1−t = d2(loc(A),l)v ∧
t0 > end(Receive(A; t1;C, authB(t, l)))
Adversary Model. The adversary model, AGT∆relay , is al-
most identical to AT∆relay but for the format of beacon mes-
sages.
Definition 19. A trace θ ∈ ΘS,PGT is feasible with re-
spect to the adversary model AGT∆relay if:
1. ∀Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ, A /∈ Vadv
2. ∀A ∈ Vadv, ∀Dcast(A; t1;α, β, authB(t, l)) ∈ θ,
(B ∈ Vadv) ∨ (∃C ∈ Vadv, ∃δ > ∆relay + dist(C,A)vadv ,∃D ∈ V, Receive(C; t1 − δ;D, authB(t, l)) ∈ θ)
Theorem 4. If v = vadv and ∆relay > 0 then PGT satis-
fies neighbor discovery for the adversary model AGT∆relay .
6. DISCUSSION
6.1 Implications
The impossibility result points to a fundamental limitation
in securing communication ND with T-protocols. Any T-
protocol, regardless of the node clock accuracy or processing
power, can be attacked by an adversary capable of relaying
messages with a small enough delay. As we discuss in the
next paragraph, the space for attacks can seem relatively
small if v = vadv. Nevertheless, it can be large enough to
constitute a realistic threat, depending essentially on three
factors. One of these is very specific to the operational envi-
ronment, and deals with the following question: How prob-
able is it to have no link between two nodes at distance d?
This is because for every non-existing link the adversary can
set up a short-range relay attack.
For the two other factors, we turn to theorems 1 and 3.
These show that for an attack to be successful, the relay-
ing delay of the adversary has to be below the threshold
R
v
. This implies the second factor - the expected threat
level. If the system designer aims at protecting the network
only against relatively limited, slow-relaying adversaries, T-
protocols can provide sufficient security (details in Section
6.3). The third factor is the ND range R. In some cases, the
system designer might be able to select a low R: this forces
the adversary to relay messages faster, but it also precludes
the discovery of nodes that are directly reachable but farther
than R. Nonetheless, R needs to be typically equal to the
communication range. Thus, for some wireless technologies,
ND using T-protocols will be more vulnerable than for oth-
ers. For example, if we can consider relatively short-range
802.11 radios, communicating typically at 100 to 150m, the
threshold is 100m
c
≈ 333ns, still significantly above the fea-
sible 40ns relaying delay reported by [23]. For WiMAX,
with a range up to 50km, the threshold is around 166µs
leaving much more space for attacks. In fact, as R → ∞,
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T-protocols become useless for securing ND, if obstacles can
be present in the environment.
In short, T-protocols need to be used with a lot of caution to
secure ND. Unless there are no obstacles in the environment,
the ND range is low, or only slow-relaying adversaries are
of concern, T-protocols cannot provide reliable security, as
they are able to prevent only wormholes ranging beyond
R. For generally applicable secure ND it is necessary to
go beyond the T-protocol class. As Theorem 4 shows, one
possibility is the TL-class with protocols such as PGT which
can secure ND regardless of ∆relay orR. Unfortunately, PGT
is more demanding on the nodes (location awareness), and
it requires line-of-sight communication (Section 6.3).
Simple Quantitative Results. Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
show that it is impossible to secure ND even if the adversary
cannot utilize an adversarial channel for the communication
of the nodes it controls (but in that case it uses directional
antennas). However, quantitatively, the relative magnitude
of v and vadv, the signal propagation velocity across the
system wireless channel and the adversary channel, respec-
tively, determine the impact of the adversary.
To illustrate this, we consider first an A′′∆relay adversary and
the Sb setting in Figure 2, with A,B correct and C adversar-
ial nodes, for which distb(A,C)+distb(B,C)+v∆relay 6 R.
These conditions are necessary for the attack to be possible.
The last inequality yields, when combined with the trian-
gle inequality distb(A,B) 6 distb(A,C) + distb(B,C), that
distb(A,B) 6 R− v∆relay. Note that the relative locations
and thus the distance of A and B are not controlled by
the adversary. This implies that the adversary can violate
ND1, only if the distance between A and B is smaller than
R− v∆relay and C is conveniently located.
On the other hand, for A′∆relay and setting Sc in Figure 2,
distc(A,C) + distc(D,B) + v
vadv
distc(C,D) + v∆relay 6 R.
Utilizing this and the triangular inequality twice, that is,
distc(A,B) 6 distc(A,C) + distc(C,D) + distc(D,B), we
get distc(A,B) 6 vadv
v
(R − v∆relay). If the last inequality
holds, the adversary can succeed with the use of an adver-
sarial channel and two nodes C,D. It is interesting that the
bound on distc(A,B) is multiplied by a factor of vadv
v
. In
other words, if v ¿ vadv, as it holds, for example, for ul-
trasound and radio frequency velocities [24], the use of the
adversarial channel magnifies the impact on ND: the ad-
versary can mislead nodes at remote locations (thus unable
to communicate directly) that they are neighbors. Thus,
whenever possible, the system designer should aim at hav-
ing v = c, which she can expect to be the choice of the
adversary. This is further strengthened by the fact that the
PGT can be proven correct only if v = vadv.
Relation among Adversary Models. Intuitively, adver-
sary A2 is stronger than adversary A1, if A2 can do ev-
erything that A1 can. Formally, this is expressed as follows:
Definition 20. Adversary model A1 is (non-strictly) weaker
than adversary model A2 (A1 6 A2), if ΘS,P,A1 ⊆ ΘS,P,A2
for every setting S and every protocol model P.
Given this definition, we can order the considered adversary
models:
A′∆relay ¹ 4
A′′∆relay 6
A∆relay 6 AT∆relay
The relation among adversary models is interesting because
one can intuitively expect that if a protocol P can solve ND
for A1, it can also solve ND for a weaker adversary model
A2.5Thus, our impossibility result, proven for the minimal
elements, and the proof of correctness of protocol PT for the
maximal element, hold for all adversary models considered
in this paper. This clarifies that ∆relay is the most significant
factor affecting the security of ND, as opposed to the ability
to use directional antennas, the adversary channel, or to
generate arbitrary messages (in a Dolev-Yao fashion).
6.2 Modeling assumptions
Our ND specification and assumptions about wireless com-
munication, protocols, and adversarial behavior all aim at
a simple model. Nonetheless, these assumptions do not im-
pair the generality and meaningfulness of our results. The
discussion below establishes this mostly with respect to the
impossibility result, as it is easy to see that most of these
simplifying assumptions do not affect the ND protocols we
model and prove correct.
Protocol Model. Recall that our definition of a protocol
model only requires that the behavior of the protocol is de-
termined by the local view. This is much broader than the
typical approach, in which a protocol is modeled by a Turing
machine. But as our definition is an over-approximation, our
impossibility result remains valid for more realistic protocol
models.
Settings and Traces. We emphasize that the general forms
of settings (correct nodes being able to communicate at ar-
bitrary distances), and Medium Access Control modeling
(Definition 4 not prohibiting a correct node from sending
and receiving an arbitrary number of messages at the same
time) is not essential to the impossibility result. It is pos-
sible to add additional constraints to make the model more
realistic, but this would impair generality and clarity.
4We use a different notation, A′∆relay ¹ A∆relay , as the “6”
relation does not hold: in one case the adversarial nodes
can only use Bcast and in the other only Dcast. However,
Bcast(m) is equivalent to a Dcast(0, 2pi,m). Accordingly, we
can define a renaming function ρ, and show that the 6 rela-
tion holds up to renaming: ρ(ΘS,P,A′∆relay
) ⊆ ΘS,P,A∆relay .
5This can be proven under the assumption that the adver-
sary model allows the adversarial nodes to remain silent,
which is the case for all the adversary models that we con-
sider. There exist adversarial models for which this does not
hold, but they are of no practical importance.
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Events. We model correct nodes equipped with omnidirec-
tional antennas. We can extend our model so that correct
nodes use directional antennas, but from the structure of the
impossibility result proof it should be clear that this would
not lift the impossibility. Mounting a successful relay attack,
however, would require adversarial node(s) to be located on
or close to the line connecting A and B.
We model success and failure (in fact, complete unawareness
of failure) in receiving a message, but not the ability of a
receiver to detect a transmission (wireless medium activity)
without successfully decoding the message. An extension
of our model to include this is straightforward and would
not affect the impossibility result. Intuitively, if nodes were
able to solve the ND problem if they cannot decode all the
messages they receive, then they would also be able to solve
ND when all messages are received correctly. We emphasize
that the above argument relies on the assumption that nodes
cannot control their wireless transmission power. However,
if nodes had this ability, the notion of neighborhood would
change, and our model would need to change as well. We
will investigate this in future work.
ND Specification. In light of the impossibility result, one
could consider an alternative, less restrictive neighbor dis-
covery specification, notably, the already mentionedmulti-party
ND that requires the participation of more than two nodes
to securely conclude on a neighbor relation. This is an inter-
esting direction resonating with emergent properties of ad-
hoc networks [9]. Technically, this ND specification would
differ in the ND2 property, where the requirement that the
protocol needs to work for some two-node setting would be
changed to an arbitrary setting. As discuss in Section 7,
there exist protocols in the literature related to our notion
of multi-party ND, but they are effective under weaker ad-
versary models. Whether some other T-protocol can solve
multi-party ND in our model is an open question we plan to
investigate in future work.
Line-of-sight Propagation. Definition 4 implies signal prop-
agation over a straight line. In reality, this is not always the
case, as two nodes could communicate even if there is no
line-of-sight between them, and the signal is, for example,
reflected. We could include this phenomenon in our model,
for example, by introducing an additional link-specific delay
to the propagation time. This would not affect any of our
results. However, from a practical point of view, for such
additionally delayed links, PT and especially PGT could re-
ject valid neighbor relations. This problem relates to the
discussion on inaccuracies in time and location information
these protocols need to cope with in practice, in Section 6.3.
6.3 Protocol Design
We discuss some of the more important aspects for actual
deployment of secure neighbor discovery protocols. First,
we consider one side of ND: A discovers if B is a neighbor.
However, with asymmetric links, a dual problem exists: A
discovers if it is a neighbor to B. The protocols we con-
sider are not designed to solve this problem, but we note
that challenge-response schemes, such as distance bounding
protocols [2], can.
Moreover, we consider ND when both nodes running the
ND protocol are correct. Removing this assumption implies
that, for example, the PT protocol does not satisfy the ND
specification: consider an adversarial node B that generates
a message time-stamped in the future, passes this message
to another adversarial node C, which in turn passes it to a
correct node A that falsely accepts (a perhaps very remote)
B as a neighbor. In Section 7 two protocols that solve this
problem under a specific assumption are discussed.
As mobility was not included in our model, the protocols
we analyze can be considered secure as long as the node
movement during the protocol execution is negligible. This
is not a strong requirement, if we compare the typical speed
at which nodes move (below the speed of sound in almost
all cases) with the RF propagation speed. However, no-
tably because some computational operations may be time-
consuming, we plan to include mobility in our model in the
future.
All the adversary models in this paper capture the tech-
nically feasible yet non-trivial ability to send and receive
messages at the same time. For a weaker security result,
one could assume that an adversarial node must receive the
whole message before it can relay it. For such an adversary,
a protocol whose every messages duration is longer than R
v
would solve ND (by Theorem 3).
Similarly to the vision of the authors of [13], PT and PGT
functionality could be integrated into every packet as a leash.
Alternatively, ND beacons can be broadcasted periodically,
with the neighbor relation interpolated in between received
beacons. The former solution provides better security at the
expense of transmission overhead, whereas the latter might
offer the adversary a window of opportunity to launch an
attack if and only if the state of neighbor relation changes
between two beacon broadcasts.
Imperfect Clocks and Localization. Up to this point, we
assumed that correct nodes have accurate time and location
information. However, inaccuracies are possible in reality:
(i) time inaccuracies due to clock drifts, failure to synchro-
nize clocks, coarse-grained clocks, as well as the difficulty
to calculate message reception time, and (ii) location inac-
curacies due to unavailability of infrastructure (e.g., Global
Positioning System (GPS), or base stations) providing lo-
cation information, malicious disruptions of infrastructure,
and granularity and capabilities of self-localization sensors.
Non-line-of-sight propagation can be perceived as another
source of time inaccuracy. As the PT and PGT protocols rely
on distance estimates based on time and location measure-
ments, their effectiveness can be affected by inaccuracies.
We model the effect of time inaccuracy by a parameter
δ, such that measured delay = real delay + d, with |d| 6
δ. Similarly, for location information, measured distance =
real distance + sv, with |s| 6 τ . We express the inaccu-
racy term sv as a function of delay (time), so that it is
straightforward to consider the cumulative impact for the
PGT protocol.
First, for PT, two correct neighbors at a distance larger than
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R − vδ may fail to conclude they are neighbors, thus vio-
lating ND2. This can be addressed if R′ = R + vδ is used
in place of the ND range R. But then, if ∆relay <
R
v
+ δ,
or ∆relay <
R′
v
, ND1 would be violated, that is, the adver-
sary would mount a successful attack. In other words, time
inaccuracies essentially decrease the ND security.
To cope with inaccuracies, the PGT protocol presented in
Section 5 needs to be modified slightly: The check for equal-
ity of the time- and location-based estimates of distance
should be replaced with approximate equality ; otherwise ND2
will be violated. More precisely, these two estimates should
be within δ + τ of each other. But, again, ensuring practi-
cality decreases security: if ∆relay < 2(δ+ τ), the adversary
could violate ND1.
More generally, for T-protocols, no additional considera-
tion with respect to the impossibility results is necessary,
as R 6 R′. But for TL-protocols, the inaccuracies in time
and location could be viewed as an impossibility factor: for
given δ, τ , there is no protocol solving the ND problem if
the adversary can relay with delay ∆relay < 2(δ + τ). We
emphasize however that the nature of these impossibility re-
sults differs, as it is not fundamental, as in the T-protocol
case, but can be mitigated by introducing more sophisti-
cated technology and obtaining accurate time and location,
as long as line-of-sight propagation is assumed.
Finally, we note that accurate time and location information
are not possible to achieve without specialized hardware. In
addition, tight synchronization is nontrivial, but challenge-
response protocols that do not need synchronized clocks can
overcome this problem.
7. RELATED WORK
The prevalent wormhole prevention mechanism is based on
distance bounding, which was first proposed by Brands and
Chaum in [2] to thwart a relay attack between two cor-
rect nodes, also termed mafia fraud. Essentially, distance
bounding estimates the distance between two nodes, with
the guarantee that it is not smaller from their real distance.
Subsequent proposals contributed in aspects such as mutual
authentication [26], efficiency [10], and resistance to exe-
cution of the protocol with a colluding group of adversarial
nodes [3, 23]. In the latter, the attack termed terrorist fraud
is thwarted under the assumption that adversarial nodes do
not expose their private cryptographic material; if not, one
adversarial node can undetectably impersonate another and
successfully stage a terrorist fraud. Authenticated ranging,
proposed by Cˇapkun and Hubaux in [27], lifts the technically
non-trivial requirement of rapid response (present in all the
above protocols), at the expense of not being resilient to a
distance fraud, when the protocol is executed with a single,
non-colluding adversarial node [3]. This group of protocols,
in which temporal packet leashes [13] and TrueLink [8] (both
not resistent to the distance fraud) can be included, was the
main inspiration for our investigation that led to a general
impossibility result.
Another group of ND mechanisms is based on location, with
geographical packet leashes [13] the primary representative.
The impossibility result does not apply here, as T-protocols
are not location-aware. Indeed, we prove that PGT, an TL-
protocol, can solve ND. We emphasize that PGT is different
from geographical packet leashes, because it requires clock
synchronization as tight as that for temporal packet leashes.
Essentially, PGT is a combination of temporal and geograph-
ical leashes. Upon careful inspection of the literature, there
exist prior passages seemingly cluing or relating to this idea:
the introduction of [12] or the discussion of combining a so-
called node-centric localization scheme with distance bound-
ing techniques [28]. Nonetheless, to the best of our knowl-
edge, we are the first to explicitly point out the advantages,
over other approaches for secure ND, of combining location
information with tight temporal bounds. We note that the
authors of [13] mention the obstacle problem, but only in
the case of geographical packet leashes. However, the solu-
tion that they propose – having a radio propagation model
at every node – is not applicable in most scenarios.
The approach of Poovendran and Lazos [21] can be seen
as an extension of a location based scheme: a few trusted
nodes (guards) are aware of their location, transmit it pe-
riodically in beacons, and all other nodes determine their
neighbors based on whether they received sufficiently many
common beacons. This scheme is a multi-party ND protocol
and thus our impossibility result does not apply. Unfortu-
nately, from the perspective of our approach, [21] has some
serious drawbacks. Most notably, it relies on the “no ob-
structions” assumption – nodes that are close but cannot
communicate can be tricked into establishing a neighbor re-
lation. In addition, adversarial nodes are rather limited in
their behavior: one can see an attack against this scheme,
in particular Claim 2, when adversarial nodes are allowed to
selectively relay beacon messages.
A scheme using directional antennas was proposed by Hu
and Evans in [12], with the interesting property that it can
be used as a two-party ND protocol, or as a multi-party ND
protocol with additional nodes serving as verifiers of neigh-
bor relations. In the two-party operation the scheme has se-
curity weaknesses that the multi-party version is called upon
to remedy. In the latter case, our impossibility result does
not apply directly. Nonetheless, significant security prob-
lems remain, with the scheme oblivious to obstacles and the
adversary model limited. As the authors point out, a suc-
cessful attack can be mounted if more than two adversarial
nodes collaborate. Recall that in our proofs we allow for
arbitrary node collaboration (or collusion).
[14] proposes to collect local, k-hop connectivity information
obtained with a non-secure ND mechanism, and to inspect
it for forbidden structures: subgraphs that are likely to exist
only if a wormhole is present in the vicinity. The exchange
of connectivity information makes it a multi-party protocol.
Although the simulations presented in [14] show a very good
detection rate, as in [21], the considered adversary is quite
naive: a single non-selective long-range wormhole.
A different approach to secure neighbor discovery could ex-
ploit radio frequency fingerprinting (RFF) [4]: devices from
the same production line are not identical, but rather the
signals each one emits may have unique identifiable features.
If these signals can be identified upon reception of a mes-
sage, it becomes impossible for an adversarial node to relay
any message undetected. If such a scheme were in place,
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our impossibility result would not apply. The reason is that
impossibility hinges on the very fact that a correct node
cannot identify how a message was received. This essen-
tially allows the adversary to relay wireless transmissions
(messages). However, it is questionable if RFF can be used
to secure ND. Investigations with different types of devices,
e.g., [22] or [25], show classification success rate around
90% in laboratory conditions. At the same time, findings
such as “... radios were found to have fingerprints that were
virtually indistinguishable from each other, making the iden-
tification process more difficult, if not impossible...” [7] clue
on unresolved limitations.
The wormhole attack, in its symptoms, bears similarity to
two other fundamental and hard to detect attacks. On one
hand, a wormhole end can be perceived as a Sybil node, with
messages tied to different identities being transmitted by a
single node. Hence, seemingly, a Sybil node detection mech-
anism [17] could be used to thwart relay attacks. However,
a wormhole can selectively relay the messages of a single
node, and still be effective (e.g. Figure 2, setting Sc). On
the other hand, as in the node replication attack, messages
tied to a single identity are transmitted by more than one
node. However, node replication is harder to detect than
a wormhole attack: schemes that address node replication
[20, 5] focus on probabilistically detecting replicas located
in remote parts of the network and require that nodes are
location-aware. Obviously, a long-range wormhole can be
easily (and deterministically) prevented using geographical
packet leashes.
A large body of work on formal reasoning on cryptographic
protocols exists, yet the classical cryptographic protocols
live in the Internet: thus these methods are agnostic about
the characteristics of the communication medium, especially
a wireless one. Recently, there has been a rising interest
in formalizing analysis of security protocols in wireless net-
works. The problem of distance bounding has been treated
formally in [15], whereas other works were concerned with
routing [16, 1, 18, 29] or local area networking [11]. These
works are concerned with different problems and their ap-
proaches are not amenable to reason about secure neighbor
discovery.
8. CONCLUSIONS
We investigate the problem of secure neighbor discovery
(ND) in wireless networks. We build a formal framework,
and provide a specification of neighbor discovery or, more
precisely, its most basic variant: two-party ND. We con-
sider two general classes of protocols: time-based protocols
(T-protocols) and time- and location-based protocols (TL-
protocols). For the T-protocol class, we identify a funda-
mental limitation governed by a threshold value depending
on the ND range: We prove that no T-protocol can solve
the ND problem if and only if adversarial nodes can relay
messages faster than this threshold. This result is a use-
ful measure of the ND security achieved by T-protocols and
leads us to investigate other classes of protocols.
In particular, we prove that no such limitation exists for
the class of TL-protocols: They can solve the ND problem
for any adversary, as long as the time and location measure-
ments are accurate enough, and line-of-sight signal propaga-
tion is assumed. The protocols we analyze are very simple if
not the simplest possible to allow positive results. In future
work, we will focus on a larger spectrum of protocols, most
notably multi-party neighbor discovery, as well as model ad-
ditional aspects, such as the ability of nodes of controlling
their transmission power.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOFS
In this section we present the proofs of the lemmas and the-
orems omitted from the main body of the paper. First we
prove Lemma 1, which was used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Next, we present and prove Lemma 2, which then used to
prove Theorem 3. The proof of Theorem 4 is nearly identi-
cal, and thus omitted.
Proof. (Lemma 1.) We need to prove that all 3 condi-
tions of Definition 10 hold.
1. ∀A ∈ Vcor, ∀Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ′, Bcast(m) ∈ P(θ′|A,t)
Take any event Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ′. Based on Condi-
tion 6.1, it holds that Bcast(t;m) ∈ θ′|A = θ|A. Using
Condition 6.1 again, we get that Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ.
Since θ is feasible with respect to T-protocol model P,
Condition 10.1 gives us Bcast(m) ∈ P(θ|A,t). Using
again the assumption θ′|A = θ|A we get the desired
Bcast(m) ∈ P(θ′|A,t).
2. ∀A ∈ Vcor, ∀Neighbor(A; t;B, t′) ∈ θ′,
Neighbor(B, t′) ∈ P(θ′|A,t)
The proof is identical as for Condition 1.
3. ∀A ∈ Vcor, ∀t ∈ X ′A, ² ∈ P(θ′|A,t), where
X ′A = R>0 \ start(θ′|A ∩ E),
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E = {Bcast(t;m) | m ∈ M, t ∈ R>0} ∪
{Neighbor(t;B, t′) | B ∈ V, t, t′ ∈ R>0}.
As θ satisfies Condition 10.3, we have ∀t ∈ XA,
² ∈ P(θ|A,t), where XA = R>0 \ start(θ|A ∩ E). Since
θ′|A = θ|A, we haveX ′A = XA and P(θ′|A,t) = P(θ|A,t),
which implies that θ′ satisfies Condition 3.
Lemma 2. For every trace θ feasible with respect to the
adversary model AT∆relay and some setting S it holds:
∀A ∈ Vadv, ∀Dcast(A; t1;α, β, authB(t)) ∈ θ,
(B ∈ Vadv) ∨ (∃C ∈ Vcor, ∃δ > ∆relay + dist(C,A)vadv ,
Bcast(C; t1 − δ; authB(t)) ∈ θ)
Proof. The 1st disjunct (B ∈ Vadv) follows immediately
from 17.2, so we assume that B ∈ Vcor and focus on the
2nd disjunct. We prove it by contradiction: assume that
Dcast(A; t1;α, β, authB(t)) ∈ θ, but Bcast(C; t; authB(t)) /∈
θ, for any correct C and and τ 6 t1 −∆relay − dist(C,A)vadv (?).
We use the following reasoning: Apply 17.2 to obtain
Receive(D; t1 − δ;E, authB(t)) ∈ θ), where δ > ∆relay +
dist(D,A)
vadv
. Next, apply 4.1 to get
Dcast(E; t1 − δ − dist(E,D)v ;α′, β′, authB(t)) ∈ θ; the other
disjunct of 4.1 is ruled out by 17.1, assumption (?) and
vadv > v, as dist(D,A)vadv +
dist(E,D)
v
> dist(E,A)
vadv
. This reasoning
can be repeated recursively, showing an infinite number of
events in θ with start time below t1. This gives a contradic-
tion with the finite cut condition.
Proof. (Theorem 3.) First, we prove ND1, which is re-
peated below for readers convenience:
ND1 ∀S ∈ Σ, ∀θ ∈ ΘS,P,A, ∀A,B ∈ Vcor,
Neighbor(A; t;B, t′) ∈ θ =⇒ t′ ::B→A
Consider a setting S and a trace θ ∈ ΘS,PT,AT∆relay such that
Neighbor(A; t0;B, t1) ∈ θ, where A,B ∈ Vcor. We want to
show that t1 ::B→A.
First, as A is correct, we can apply 16.2 and get
Receive(A; t1;C1, authB(t)) ∈ θ, where t1 + |authB(t)| < t0
and t1 6 t+ Rv (?).
Next, apply 4.1 to get [t1, t1+ |authB(t)|] ::C→A and either:
(a) Bcast(C; t1 − δ1; authB(t)) ∈ θ or
(b) Dcast(C; t1 − δ1;α, β, authB(t)) ∈ θ.
where δ1 =
dist(C,A)
v
.
First, consider case (a). Refer to 17.1 to get C ∈ Vcor and
then to 16.1 to get C = B. Thus t1 ::B→A, as desired.
Next, consider case (b). We can apply Lemma 2, to obtain
Bcast(D; t1−δ1−δ2; authB(t)) ∈ θ, where δ2 > ∆relay. Refer
to 16.1 to get D = B and t = t1 − δ1 − δ2 < t1 −∆relay 6
t1 − Rv . We can rewrite the later t1 > t+ Rv . This is a con-
tradiction with (?), thus (b) cannot be true. Consequently,
(a) is the only valid option, and ND1 is satisfied.
In the 2nd part of the proof, we prove that PT satisfies ND2’,
presented below. Intuitively, it requires that in every setting
where two correct nodes are close enough and are neighbors
for a long enough (protocol and setting specific) time, it
should be possible to conclude that they are neighbors. It is
easy to see that this property is stronger than ND2, as every
setting considered in ND2 satisfies the conditions of ND2’.
ND2’ ∃T > 0, ∀S ∈ Σ, ∀A,B ∈ Vcor, ∀t1, t2 > 0,
(t2− t1 > T ∧ [t1, t2] ::B→A ∧ dist(A,B) 6 R) =⇒
(∃θ ∈ ΘS,P,A, ∃t′ ∈ [t1, t2],
Neighbor(A; t;B, t′) ∈ θ)
Let T = sup{|authA(t)||A ∈ V, t ∈ R>0} (we assume it
is finite). Consider a setting S, where nodes A,B ∈ Vcor,
dist(A,B) = d 6 R and [t1, t2] ::A↔B, where t2 − t1 > T .
Denote t0 = t1 − dv . Obviously, the following trace satisfies
Neighbor(A; t;B, t′) ∈ θ, for t′ = t1 and t = t1+|authB(t0)|+
1:
θ =
˘
Bcast(B; t0; authB(t0)),
Receive(A; t1;B, authB(t0)),
Neighbor(A; t1 + |authB(t0)|+ 1;B, t1)
¯
It suffices to show this trace is feasible; this is easy to check
with respect to the setting S and trivial with respect to the
adversary model. Trace θ is also feasible with respect to the
T-protocol model PT: Condition 16.1 is obviously satisfied,
and Condition 16.2 follows from d
v
6 R
v
.
14
